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Summary 
There is no right to asylum, but there is a right not to be returned to 
persecution. The principle of non-refoulement, which is expressed in article 
3 ECHR, encompasses this right and it is an essential part of individual 
rights protection. The Dublin Regulation presumes that EU member state 
are safe and it designates which member state is responsible to try an 
application for asylum. The regulation allows for the transfer of the 
applicant to the designated state – a practice known as a Dublin transfer. 
 
This thesis applies the sources of law and the means of interpretation of both 
international law and EU law to discern the requirements for a Dublin 
transfer to be legal according to the ECHR and the Dublin Regulation 
respectively. The findings are compared and discussed from an individual 
rights perspective.  
 
Both systems require that there should be substantial grounds for believing 
that the applicant faces a real risk of torture, inhumane or degrading 
treatment in the receiving state for the transfer to be precluded. The 
prohibition includes indirect refoulement. The requirements on the applicant 
to meet these prerequisites have been considerably lowered by the ECtHR. 
 
The Dublin Regulation contains the additional prerequisite that systemic 
flaws in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions should cause this 
risk. There is lacking consensus on how this provision should be interpreted, 
but there is ample ground to argue that it should be interpreted in a manner 
compatible with the ECHR.  
 
According to both systems, the presumption of safety can be rebutted. The 
transferring state has a duty to inspect the actual conditions if there is 
information available indicating that human rights are not respected in the 
receiving state. The CJEU maintains that the presumption of safety concerns 
the raison d’être of the EU. 
 
From an individual rights perspective it is unsatisfactory that the meaning of 
systemic flaws is unclear and that the responsibility to investigate is 
contingent upon third party information. The present Dublin III Regulation 
lacks a system to generally suspend transfers to certain states, which means 
that protections is granted on a case-by-case basis, where the authorities of 
the member states must assess whether other member states fulfil their 
international obligations. 
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Sammanfattning 
Det finns ingen rätt till asyl, men det finns en rätt att inte återsändas till 
förföljelse. Denna rätt omfattas av principen om non-refoulement, som 
uttrycks i artikel 3 EKMR, och är en grundläggande del i skyddet för 
individuella rättigheter. Dublinförordningen presumerar att EU länder är 
säkra och utpekar vilket land som ansvarar för att pröva en asylansökan. 
Förordningen tillåter att den sökande överförs till den ansvariga staten, 
vilket kallas för en Dublinöverföring. 
 
Denna uppsats tillämpar både folkrättens och EU-rättens källor och 
tolkningsmetoder för att utreda vilka krav som ställs enligt EKMR 
respektive Dublinförordningen för att en överföring ska vara laglig. 
Resultaten jämförs och diskuteras utifrån ett individrättsligt perspektiv. 
 
Båda system förutsätter att det finns starka skäl att tro att sökande löper en 
reell risk att utsättas för tortyr, omänsklig eller förnedrande behandling i 
mottagarlandet för att överföringen inte ska vara tillåten. Förbudet omfattar 
även indirekt refoulering. Kraven på den asylsökande för att uppfylla dessa 
rekvisit har sänkts betydligt av Europadomstolen. 
 
Dublinförordningen innehåller ett ytterligare rekvisit som stipulerar att 
risken ska orsakas av systematiska brister i asylförfarandet och i 
mottagningsvillkoren. Det saknas konsensus gällande hur detta rekvisit ska 
tolkas, men det finns goda grunder att argumentera för att det ska tolkas på 
ett sådant sätt att det överensstämmer med EKMR. 
 
Enligt de båda systemen, kan presumtionen att EU-länder är säkra 
kullkastas. Den överförande staten har en undersökningsplikt gällande de 
verkliga förhållandena, när det finns tillgänglig information som tyder på 
brister i respekten för mänskliga rättigheter i mottagarlandet. EU-domstolen 
anser att presumtionen för säkerhet angår EUs existensberättigande. 
 
Från ett individrättsligt perspektiv är det otillfredsställande att innebörden 
av systematiska brister är oklar och att undersökningsplikten är beroende av 
information från tredje part. Den nuvarande Dublinförordningen III saknar 
ett system för att generellt ställa in överföringar till vissa stater. Detta 
innebär att varje fall måste bedömas individuellt och att medlemsstaternas 
myndigheter är tvungna att bedöma huruvida andra medlemsländer lever 
upp till sina internationella åtaganden.  
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Abbreviations 
CEAS  Common European Asylum System 
CFREU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
EU  European Union 
ICJ-Statute  Statute of the International Court of Justice 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization  
UK United Kingdom 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background   
There is no generally recognized right to asylum, but there is a right not to 
be returned to persecution, which is known as the principle of non-
refoulement.1 This right is explicitly stated in article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention2, but articles of various human rights documents have been 
interpreted to contain this provision, for example article 3 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 3 (ECHR).4 
 
Since the entry of the principle of non-refoulement into the sphere of human 
rights law, non-refoulement is an essential part of the protection of 
individual rights.5 Lately, there is a tendency for so-called industrialized 
states to question the reception of refugees. Some challenge whether there is 
an obligation to receive refugees at all.6 
 
The Dublin Regulation is a European Union (EU) regulation that designate 
which state is responsible to try an application for asylum. It contains a 
system that allows for the transfer of an applicant to the designated member 
state, a practice known as a Dublin transfer.7 
 
An underlying principle of the Dublin Regulation, and indeed of the EU, is 
mutual trust and the presumption that member states are safe for asylum-
seekers. The principle is essential for the efficiency of the system.8  
 
Based on recent jurisprudence this thesis explores the conditions for the 
legality of a Dublin transfer according to the ECHR and the Dublin 
Regulation, analysing the issue from an individual rights perspective. 
1.2 Purpose 
The relationship between the Dublin Regulation and the ECHR highlights 
the tension between the efficiency of the EU and individual rights 
protection. With this perspective in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to 
compare and discuss the individual rights protection within the Dublin 
Regulation and the ECHR. 
                                                 
1
 Hathaway 2005 p. 300-301; Kälin, Caroni and Heim 2011 p. 1334-1335. 
2
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 28 July 1951. 
3
 Rome 4 November 1950. 
4
 Kälin, Caroni and Heim 2011 p. 1350-1354. 
5
 Cherubini 2015 p. 7. 
6
 Hathaway 2005 p. 3-5. 
7
 Seidlitz 2014 s. 31. 
8
 Van Den Sanden 2012 p. 162-165. See also recital 3 Dublin III Regulation. 
 5
1.3 Research Questions 
In the light of the purpose, the research questions are: 
1. What are the requirements on the legality of a Dublin transfer 
according to article 3 ECHR? 
2. What are the requirements on the legality of a Dublin transfer 
according to the Dublin Regulation? 
3. Which are the differences and similarities? 
4. What are the consequences of the findings in questions 1-3 from an 
individual rights perspective? 
1.4 Material 
The legal documents – the Dublin Regulation and the ECHR – together with 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) form the basis of this study. 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, and Tarakhel v. Switzerland were both 
delivered by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. The joint cases C-411/10 
and C-493/10 are the central cases from the CJEU. 
 
Literature is primarily used to provide context, whereas mostly articles give 
in-depth commentary. A judgement from the United Kingdom (UK) 
Supreme Court, which was cited in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, has been used 
for its commentary rather than a as a primary source. Care must be given to 
the aspect of time, since some commentary was made before the Dublin III 
Regulation9 entered into force. 
1.5 Method and Theory 
The legal dogmatic method discerns the content of the law through the 
application of its sources.10 Since this thesis concern the content of EU law 
and international law, it is necessary to use their sources and means of 
interpretation. 
 
The sources of EU law are primary and secondary law. CJEU jurisprudence 
has the same status as primary law, whereas the Dublin Regulation and the 
EU directives are secondary law. Judgements from the Grand Chamber, 
such as the joint cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, are particularly important. 
Literature is not a source of law, but influences its development.11 
Commentary is thus helpful to understand the content of the law.  
 
                                                 
9
 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European parliament and of the council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). 
10
 Kleineman 2013 p. 21-26. 
11
 Bernitz and Kjellgren 2014 p. 178-184, 193. 
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The CJEU interprets EU law as a coherent system. It uses linguistic 
interpretation, systemic interpretation, the purpose of the regulation and 
teleological interpretation hierarchically. According to systemic 
interpretation, main rules are interpreted broadly, whereas exceptions are 
interpreted narrowly. Preambles and recitals indicate the purpose of the 
legislation.12 This method is used to interpret the Dublin Regulation. 
 
The sources of international law, according to article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice13 (ICJ-Statute), are conventions, customary 
law and general principles.14 Judgements and literature serve as means of 
interpretation. The starting point of the interpretation of the ECHR are the 
rules of interpretation of treaties established in articles 31 and 3215 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties16 (VCLT). However, the ECtHR 
is entitled to interpret the convention according to article 32 ECHR. The 
judgements and the means of interpretation established by the court are thus 
given a prominent status.17  
 
According to the ECtHR, the ECHR is interpreted coherently and as a 
dynamic instrument adaptable to changes in society. Furthermore, it is 
interpreted according to its purpose, which is to provide effective individual 
rights protection.18 Article 3 ECHR has been interpreted as prohibiting 
refoulement through ECtHR jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is central to the 
thesis, whereas literature is used to discern the content of the law. 
 
Comparative method is used to define similarities and differences and to 
explain them. The rules compared must regulate the same phenomena and it 
is necessary to regard that the phenomena may be regulated in different 
segments of the law.19 Article 3 ECHR regulate fundamental human rights 
protection, whereas the Dublin Regulation treats the issue as the procedure 
to define the responsible member state. Even though this thesis focuses on 
positive law, which may be subject to change,20 the underlying conflict of 
interest goes beyond positive law. 
 
This thesis uses the theory that non-refoulement is the fundament of 
individual rights protection for asylum-seekers, and that it challenges the 
principle of mutual trust and the efficiency of the Dublin system.21 The 
theory is employed through a critical and analytical method that uses 
arguments made in literature to compare and discuss the ECHR and the 
Dublin Regulation.22 
                                                 
12
 Ibid p. 185-189. 
13
 San Francisco 26 June 1945. 
14
 Article 38 ICJ-Statute corresponds to customary law. 
15
 Articles 31-32 VCLT correspond to customary law. 
16
 Vienna 23 May 1969. 
17
 Helland 2012 p. 71-74. 
18
 Danelius 2015 p. 55. 
19
 Bogdan 2013 p. 5-6, 34-36, 46-47. 
20
 See Sandgren 2006 p. 551. 
21
 See subchapter 1.1. 
22
 See Sandgren 2015 p. 45-48. 
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1.6 Limitations 
The EU has historically relied on the ECHR and the ECtHR to develop 
principles for human rights protection.23 Non-refoulement as interpreted by 
the ECtHR has a wider applicability than what the Refugee Convention 
suggests.24 Consequently, this thesis is limited to the comparison of the 
Dublin Regulation and the ECHR. Albeit significant, it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to discuss other international human rights instruments. 
 
Although other issues are raised by the jurisprudence discussed, and the 
ECtHR has prohibited expulsion on other grounds than article 3 ECHR,25 
this thesis focuses on non-refoulement according to article 3 ECHR. The 
thesis focuses on the Dublin Regulation, and it will therefore not discuss 
other provisions of non-refoulement in EU law. It should be noted, that the 
CJEU interprets the Dublin Regulation in the light of applicable EU 
legislation. 
1.7 Previous Research 
There is extensive literature on the principle of non-refoulement.26  
Cherubini analyses asylum law in the EU,27 and there is a continuous 
discussion about the Dublin Regulation in law journals.28 This thesis has an 
explicit comparative and individual rights perspective and aims to be a part 
of this on-going discussion. 
1.8 Disposition 
Chapter 2 gives a background to the Dublin Regulation, non-refoulement 
according to the ECHR, and their interrelation. Chapter 3 discusses the 
lawfulness of Dublin transfers from the ECHR perspective, whereas chapter 
4 discusses the same issue from the perspective of the Dublin Regulation 
and the CJEU interpretation. Chapter 5 compares the systems and presents 
arguments made in literature. The individual rights perspective permeate the 
thesis, but it will particularly be discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, the research 
questions are answered in chapter 6. 
 
The cases are not presented chronologically, but according to the body of 
law to which they pertain. The judgements C-411/10 and C-493/10 were 
given prior to Tarakhel v. Switzerland and subsequent to M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece. 
                                                 
23
 Cherubini 2015 p. 176-177. 
24
 Kälin, Caroni and Heim 2011 p 1353-1354. 
25
 See Costello 2012 p. 91. 
26
 For example Danelius 2015, Hathaway 2005 and Zimmermann 2011. 
27
 See Cherubini 2015. 
28
 For example Battjes and Brouwer 2015, Costello 2012, Lübbe 2015, Mallia 2011 and 
Moreno-Lax 2012, Morgades-Gil 2015. 
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2 The Dublin Regulation and 
Article 3 ECHR 
This chapter gives a background to the Dublin Regulation, non-refoulement 
according to the ECHR and their interrelation. 
2.1 The Dublin Regulation 
The Dublin Regulation designates which member state is responsible to try 
an application for asylum, and it is applicable in the EU, Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland and Lichtenstein. As the Dublin III Regulation entered into 
force in 2014, it replaced the Dublin II Regulation.29 Thus, the Dublin II 
Regulation was in force at the time of the verdicts discussed in this thesis. 
When referring to the specific legal documents, they will be referred to as 
the Dublin II Regulation and the Dublin III Regulation respectively. When 
the system is discussed in abstract terms, it will be referred to as the Dublin 
Regulation. Together with four minimum directives regulating conditions of 
reception, qualification, procedure and temporary protection, the regulation 
make up the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).30 
 
The sovereignty clause of the Dublin Regulation31 is central to the 
jurisprudence discussed, as it permits states to accept the responsibility of an 
obligation although they are not obliged to do so. Previously, there were 
uncertainties whether the clause had a compulsory scope of application and 
whether the presumption that member states are safe could be rebutted.32 
The jurisprudence discussed subsequently clarified this issue and lead to the 
altered provisions in the current Dublin III Regulation.33 
2.2 Non-refoulement According to Article 
3 ECHR 
Article 3 ECHR prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. 
Because the purpose of the convention is effective individual rights 
protection, it is interpreted as a prohibition of refoulement. If there are 
substantial grounds for believing that a person faces a real risk of being 
                                                 
29
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
30
 Seidlitz 2014 p. 31. 
31
 See article 3.2 Dublin II Regulation and article 17 Dublin III Regulation. 
32
 Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 4-5. 
33
 See subchapter 4.2. 
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subject to a treatment contrary to article 3, transfer, expulsion and 
extradition is prohibited.34 
 
Substantial ground for believing that a violation will occur does not require 
certainty but there should be more than an abstract possibility.35 It is 
justified because the transferring state does not directly inflict harm.36 The 
risk must be individualized, meaning that a general risk of ill-treatment is 
insufficient.37 In response of restrictive state practice, the court has lowered 
the requirement.38 
 
A real risk is a foreseeable risk.39 The states are liable when they know, or 
ought to have known, of the risk of a transfer.40 For ill-treatment to 
contravene article 3, it must attain a minimum level of severity.41 Each case 
is assessed individually.42 
 
Reservations and derogations to article 3 are not permitted.43 Its absolute 
nature is stressed in cases where exception is not permitted even if the 
applicant is a threat to national security.44 The court assess whether future 
transfers would violate the convention prior to their execution, because the 
damage for the applicant is irreversible.45 If there is a risk of a violation, it 
can be mitigated if the receiving state guarantees the respect for the 
individual’s rights.46 
2.3 The Relationship Between the Dublin 
Regulation and the ECHR 
According to ECtHR jurisprudence, states are always liable when they 
exercise their discretion, even if they have transferred some powers to a 
supranational organization.47 Since the sovereignty clause of the Dublin 
Regulation permits state discretion, states are liable for its application. 
According to the CJEU, member states implement EU legislation when they 
invoke the sovereignty clause, why they are liable according to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union48 (CFREU).49 
                                                 
34
 Soering vs the UK paras. 87-88, 91; Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden paras. 69-70. See 
also Danelius 2015 p. 92-93. 
35
 Cherubini 2015 p 110. 
36
 Costello 2012 p. 90. 
37
 Danelius 2015 p. 93. 
38
 Mink 2012 p. 136. 
39
 Vilvarajah and Others v. the UK para. 108. See also Costello p. 90. 
40
 Cherubini 2015 p. 107-108. 
41
 Danelius 2015 s. 78. 
42
 Soering v the UK para. 100. 
43
 Cerna 2015 p. 368; Danelius 2015 p. 78. 
44
 Chahal v. the UK paras. 79-80; Saadi v. Italy para. 127. See also Mallia 2011 p. 127. 
45
 Soering v. the UK para. 90. See also Cerna 2015 p. 368. 
46
 Danelius 2015 p. 93. 
47
 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland paras. 152-157. 
48
 Lisbon 13 December 2007. 
49
 C-411/10 and C-493/10 para. 69. 
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Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union50 prescribes that the EU shall 
accede to the ECHR and that the CFREU shall have status as primary law. 
To the extent that they correspond, the meaning and scope of the rights of 
the Charter are equal to the ECHR, according to article 52.3 CFREU. 
Article 4 CFREU corresponds to article 3 ECHR and therefore they have the 
same meaning. This also implies that ECtHR jurisprudence is applicable to 
the charter.51 Recital 39 of the Dublin III Regulation expressly recognizes 
that the regulation adheres to the Charter. 
                                                 
50
 Lisbon 13 December 2007. 
51
 Van Den Sanden p. 157-159. 
 11
3 The Legality of Dublin 
Transfers According to the 
ECHR 
The ECtHR has assessed Dublin transfers in a number of cases. This chapter 
focuses on the Grand Chamber cases M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
delivered in 2011, and Tarakhel v. Switzerland delivered in 2014. Indirect 
refoulement and the presumption of safety will be discussed first. 
3.1 Indirect Refoulement and the 
Presumption of Safety 
Indirect refoulement is refoulement via an intermediary. In T.I. v. the UK, 
which concerned a Dublin transfer, the ECtHR ruled that the transferring 
state is liable if the receiving state refoules the applicant. The court accepted 
the presumption that EU member states are safe, but maintained that it 
cannot be applied automatically.52 States must consider if the presumption 
can be rebutted, but the court was unspecific regarding the requirements for 
its rebuttal.53 In K.R.S. v. the UK, the court affirmed that the presumption 
can be rebutted and that indirect refoulement is encompassed by article 3 
ECHR. However, it based the presumption largely on Greece’s formal 
obligations and found that there was insufficient evidence to rebut it.54  
3.2 M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece 
Prior to M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, there was dissimilar practice among 
EU member states due to lacking guidance on the application of the 
sovereignty clause.55 The case clarified and developed several concepts. 
 
The applicant had entered the EU through Greece before arriving in 
Belgium. Despite appealing the decision, he was returned to Greece.56 In 
Greece, he was imprisoned in substandard conditions, received no help from 
the authorities in providing for his needs of subsistence and experienced 
serious shortcomings in the asylum procedure.57 Both Greece and Belgium 
were found to have violated the ECHR for exposing him to these 
conditions.58 
                                                 
52
 T.I. v. the UK p. 15. 
53
 Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 7-10. 
54
 K.R.S. v. the UK p 16-18. 
55
 Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 17. 
56
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras 9-28. 
57
 Ibid paras. 34-37, 43-44, 161-162, 167-193, 300-302. 
58
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras. 387-389 and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece “For 
these Reasons, the Court” paras. 1-13. 
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3.2.1 The Limit of Mutual Trust 
The presumption of safety is acknowledged, but rendered rebuttable, in T.I. 
v. the UK. In K.R.S. v. the UK, the ECtHR relied on the formal obligations 
of Greece as a guarantor of its adherence to those obligations.59 The 
principle of T.I. v. UK is revisited and expanded in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. 
 
Although K.R.S. v. the UK was delivered less than six months prior to the 
transfer of M.S.S,60 the court held that Belgium knew, or should have 
known, that the situation in Greece was deficient.61 The court argued that 
the deficiencies were known to Belgium because the number of reports 
indicating deficiencies had increased, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had requested Belgium to suspend 
transfers to Greece and there was an ongoing process to revise the Dublin II 
Regulations to improve its human rights protection.62 The diplomatic 
assurances that Belgium had received from Greece were insufficient since 
they had been issued subsequent to the decision to transfer and lacked 
individual guarantees.63 
 
The court concluded that formal obligations are insufficient guarantees that 
states will adhere to them in practice, if there is available information 
indicating human rights infringements.64 In such cases, the burden of proof 
cannot rest solely on the applicant, but the transferring state has a duty to 
investigate.65 Thus, the state must not only permit the appeal of the decision, 
but it must also investigate ex officio when the circumstance so warrant.66 
3.2.2 New Usage of General Evidence 
The ECtHR attached importance to reports from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), such as UNHCR and Amnesty International, which 
described the general situation for asylum-seekers.67 Although it was never 
concluded whether the applicant had been detained in the detention centres 
described in the reports, his accounts were accepted since they were 
supported by the reports and Greece could not prove that he had not been 
treated in such a manner.68 Thus, if the applicant’s accounts are supported 
by general information, they shall be presumed to be true. 
                                                 
59
 See subchapter 3.1. 
60
 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bratza. 
61
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 358. 
62
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras. 347-352. See also Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 26. 
63
 M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece para. 354. 
64
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 353. See also Mallia 2011 p. 125; Moreno-Lax 2012 
p. 27. 
65
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 358-359. See also Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 27-28. 
66
 Clayton 2011 p. 762-763. 
67
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras. 159-160. 
68
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras. 226-234. See also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó Section I; Costello 2012 p. 
86. 
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The usage of general evidence elaborates on previous jurisprudence where 
the need to individualize the risk of ill-treatment is lowered. Even if the risk 
in this case is not directed directly towards the applicant, it does not reduce 
the ill-treatment experienced.69 
3.2.3 Lowered Thershold of Minimum Level of 
Severity 
For ill-treatment to amount to a breach of article 3 ECHR, it must reach a 
minimum level of severity.70 Article 3 does not entail an obligation to 
provide for the needs of subsistence, but such an obligation follows from the 
Reception Directive71.72 The ECtHR considered that asylum-seekers are a 
particularly vulnerable group.73 Their vulnerability in conjunction with the 
positive law obligation lead the court conclude that the ill-treatment M.S.S. 
had been exposed to reached the threshold of minimum level of severity.74 
Consequently, the vulnerability of asylum-seekers together with the positive 
law obligation lowers the tolerance of ill-treatment of asylum-seekers.75 
3.3 Tarakhel v. Switzerland 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland concerned a family that had been received in Italy, 
but continued to Switzerland where they applied for asylum. Switzerland 
ordered their transfer to Italy according to the Dublin Regulation, which the 
family appealed.76 The ECtHR ruled that transferring the applicants without 
receiving detailed guarantees on the reception conditions prior to the 
transfer, would violate article 3 ECHR.77 Prior to the judgement, the court 
had deemed a number of cases regarding Italy inadmissible,78 why this 
Grand Chamber case is a significant new assessment of when ill-treatment is 
a violation. Delivering the judgement subsequent to the CJEU case 
discussed below, the ECtHR revisited the approach in M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece.79 
 
The presumption of safety underlying the Dublin Regulation is rebuttable, 
and the standard that should be assessed is whether there are substantial 
                                                 
69
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 359. See also Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 28. 
70
 See subchapter 2.2. 
71
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers. See also Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants 
for international protection (recast). 
72
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras. 249-250. 
73
 Ibid paras. 232-233, 251. 
74
 Ibid para. 263. 
75
 Costello 2012 p. 85. 
76
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland paras. 9-21. 
77
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland ”For These Reasons, the Court” para. 2. 
78
 See for example Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy decision of 
2 April 2013. 
79
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland para. 101. 
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grounds to believe that there is a real risk of a violation. The source of the 
risk is irrelevant.80 
 
As in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the court relies on reports describing 
the general reception conditions as insufficient. In the light of the available 
information, the court holds that the criteria of substantial grounds to 
believe that there is a real risk is met.81 
 
There must be an individual assessment of whether the threshold of 
minimum level of severity of the ill-treatment is met. The court reiterates 
that asylum-seekers are particularly vulnerable and emphasize the extreme 
vulnerability of children. If the reception conditions are such as would cause 
the children anxiety and stress, the treatment is contrary to article 3.82 
 
In order to ascertain that the applicants are not ill-treated, the transferring 
state must obtain detailed assurances specifying the reception units and its 
conditions as well as guarantees that family will be kept together.83 Thus, 
when the quality of the reception conditions is uncertain and the applicant is 
especially vulnerable, the transferring state is obliged to obtain detailed 
assurances for the transfer to be lawful.84 
                                                 
80
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland paras. 103-104. See also Morgades-Gil 2015 p. 445. 
81
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland paras. 108-115. 
82
 Ibid paras. 118-119. 
83
 Ibid paras. 120-121. 
84
 Morgades-Gil 2015 p. 440. 
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4 The Legality of Dublin 
Transfers According the 
Dublin Regulation 
The CJEU tried the permissibility of a Dublin transfer according to the 
Dublin Regulation in the joint cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 delivered by 
the Grand Chamber less than a year after M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 
The CJEU follows the ECtHR largely, but the case is significant as it 
transfers the reasoning into EU law.85 It also allowed the CJEU to formulate 
its own condition for when the presumption of safety can be rebutted. 
4.1 Joint Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 
The joint cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 are preliminary rulings regarding 
asylum-seekers who had entered the EU through Greece and continued to 
the UK and Ireland respectively. In both cases, the appeal against the 
transfer was pending before the national courts.86 
 
The CJEU maintains that the presumption of safety and mutual trust are 
fundamental premises for the CEAS and concern the raison d’être of the 
EU. Even if operational problems of a system may cause rights 
infringements, the presumption remains a starting point. Slight 
infringements of the CEAS do not suffice to prevent transfers, as this would 
undermine the system.87 
 
Human rights must be respected in practice, why relying on a conclusive 
presumption based on the formal obligations of the states is incompatible 
with EU law.88 Reports by NGOs concerning the conditions of asylum-
seekers make it possible to evaluate the risk of a transfer.89 The presumption 
can be rebutted when: 
 
“[The Member States] cannot be unaware that systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount 
to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker 
would face a real risk of being subject to inhuman and 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter.”90 
                                                 
85
 Costello 2012 p. 92. 
86
 C-411/10 and C-493/10 paras. 34-43, 51-52. 
87
 Ibid paras. 78-85. 
88
 C-411/10 and C-493/10 paras 102-105. See also Mink 2012 p. 145-146. 
89
 C-411/10 and C-493/10 paras. 90-91. 
90
 Ibid para. 94. 
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4.2 The Dublin III Regulation 
Because of the jurisprudence discussed above, the Dublin III Regulation 
was modified to include a new wording of the second paragraph of article 
3.2, which specifies that a transfer may not occur when: 
 
“[…] [T]here are substantial grounds for believing that 
there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the 
reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, 
resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, […].”91 
 
By including the provision under the heading “Access to the procedure for 
examining an application for international protection”, it is clear that the 
Dublin III Regulation treats it as an exception to the main rule that a transfer 
should be made to the state made responsible by the regulation. The 
sovereignty clause remains in the Dublin III Regulation, but it is not linked 
to the determination of the responsible state.92 
 
The regulation sheds some light on the interpretation of systemic failures. 
Recital 21 states that deficiencies in the asylum system can jeopardize its 
functioning, which could lead to a risk of a human rights violation. 
According to recital 39, the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted in the 
light of the CFREU. 
                                                 
91
 Article 3.2 Dublin III Regulation. 
92
 Cherubini 2015 p. 244-246. 
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5 Comparison and Critique 
The judgements discussed above have generated debate in the literature. 
This chapter reviews the arguments from an individual rights perspective 
and compares the conclusions of the two systems of law regarding Dublin 
transfers. 
5.1 The ECHR and the ECtHR 
As discussed in chapter 3, the ECtHR lowers the requirements on the 
individualization of the threat as well as the minimum level of severity of 
the ill-treatment suffered. It also enhances the responsibility of the 
transferring states to assess the actual conditions of the receiving state. 
5.1.1 An Individualized Threat? 
Concerning the assessment of the applicant’s living conditions in M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, the partly dissenting Judge Sajó criticizes the majority 
for accepting general conditions described in reports as a base for state 
responsibility, without thoroughly investigating the conditions for the 
individual applicant.93 
 
This view is mirrored in Tarakhel v. Switzerland where the partly dissenting 
judges are critical that the majority accepts the general risk of mistreatment 
as sufficient, without establishing whether there is a risk in the specific case. 
Given the circumstances, there was no foreseeable risk that article 3 ECHR 
would be breached.94 
5.1.2 How Ill is Ill-treatment? 
Judge Sajó criticizes that the majority in the case M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece found that the living conditions of M.S.S. breached the ECHR. First, 
he argues that asylum-seekers are not homogenous and that everyone is not 
equally vulnerable. Second, he considers the majority a small step from 
accepting a general and unconditional welfare obligation based on article 3. 
Third, he argues that the Reception directive cannot affect the scope of 
article 3 as there is a need to differentiate between EU law and the ECHR.95 
 
Clayton, at Middlesex University, considers the positive law obligation from 
the Reception directive to be influential rather than decisive to the court’s 
                                                 
93
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece Partly Dissenting and Partly Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Sajó Section II. 
94
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Casadevall, Berro-
Lefèvre and Jäderblom. 
95
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Sajó Section II. See also Mallia 2011 p. 119-120. 
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conclusion. If it were a prerequisite, there would be a different level of 
tolerance of ill-treatment outside of the EU.96 
5.1.3 Where is the End of Trust? 
Moreno-Lax, at the University of Oxford, argues that the court alters the 
balance between rule and exception by maintaining the need to verify the 
respect for human rights in practice.97 From Tarakhel v. Switzerland, it is 
clear that there must be an individualized risk assessment prior to a 
transfer.98 The responsibility to investigate is a heavy burden on the 
transferring state.99   
 
When are further inquiries warranted? Clayton argues that the regular 
standard, which is that when there are substantial grounds for believing that 
there is a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3, must apply. Whether 
there should be a survey in every case, or only in cases where there is 
information indicating deficiencies, remains unanswered. In her view, it 
may be coincidental whether such information is available to the state.100  
5.2 The Dublin III Regulation and the 
CJEU 
The most controversial part of the CJEU judgement and the subsequent 
change to the Dublin Regulation discussed above, are the rebuttal of the 
presumption of safety and the significance of the prerequisite systemic 
flaws. Both will be discussed below and put into relation with the ECHR. 
5.2.1 Presumption of Safety and Mutual Trust 
Mutual trust within the EU presupposes that member states share a certain 
set of values and that they do not diverge considerably from each other. This 
preposition is not only central to the CEAS, but to the EU as a whole.101 
Trust is important both in principle and in practice, because it is necessary 
for the system to work.102 In practice, there are large disparities in the 
treatment of asylum-seekers and their applications.103 According to 
Morgades-Gil, at Pompeu Fabra University, the failure to implement the 
CEAS and upholding human rights indicate that the presumption is 
erroneous.104 
 
                                                 
96
 Clayton 2011 p. 767-768. 
97
 Moreno-Lax 2012 p. 29. 
98
 Battjes and Brouwer 2015 p. 191. 
99
 Mallia 2011 p. 125-126. 
100
 Clayton 2011 p. 763. 
101
 Van Den Sanden 2012 p. 162-164. 
102
 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department para. 40. 
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 Lieven 2012 p. 228. 
104
 Morgades-Gil 2015 p. 441. 
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In the judgement, mutual trust and fundamental rights protection collide. 
The CJEU considers the raison d’être of the EU to be at stake.105 Van Den 
Sanden, at the University of Leuven, argues that the judgement shows the 
need to differentiate between formal and substantive mutual trust. The latter 
requires the assessment of the situation in practice.106 Even if there is formal 
mutual trust, the inquiry into the specific situation must not be reduced.107 
 
Costello at Worchester Collage considers trust to be a regulatory tool rather 
that the raison d’être of the EU. Even if there is trust, it is not always 
justified. Asylum-seekers lack the means to hold authorities accountable, 
which indicates that there is little substantial ground for the confidence. 
Checks for fundamental rights protection could enhance trust by 
ascertaining that it is justified.108 
 
When is the presumption of safety rebutted? According to the court, it is 
rebutted when member states cannot be unaware that there are 
deficiencies.109 According to Costello, this confirms that there is a 
presumption and that the courts should assess general information to 
consider its rebuttal.110 The CJEU’s phrasing corresponds to the ECtHR’s 
contention that states are liable when they knew, or ought to have known, 
about the risks of a transfer.111 Cherubini, at LUISS Guido Carli, considers 
that the court’s contention that not every infringement of the CEAS can 
preclude a transfer indicates that CJEU is eager to safeguard the interests of 
the EU.112 
 
Prior to the CJEU verdict, the extent of the duty of inspection of the states 
was contested. Some states that intervened in the judgement argued that it 
would be contrary to EU law for one member state to assess the compliance 
of another.113 It remains uncertain whether every transfer must be assessed, 
or only those where there is information available indicating human rights 
violations. Regardless, responsibility rests heavily on the transferring 
state.114 
5.2.2 Systemic Flaws 
There are two main positions regarding the interpretation of the prerequisite 
systemic deficiencies, or systemic flaws as it is phrased in the Dublin III 
Regulation. One argues that a flaw must be systemic to preclude a transfer, 
whereas the other considers the cause of the flaw irrelevant.115 Lord Kerr of 
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the Supreme Court of the UK argues that it would be curious to permit a 
transfer contrary to article 3 ECHR because the violation is not systemic. 
This would create a tension between EU law and the ECHR.116 
 
The former position argues that a single fundamental human rights violation 
is insufficient to rebut the presumption since it is not systemic.117 Thus, 
systemic flaws is an additional prerequisite compared to the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, which raises the threshold.118 
 
To reconcile these positions, several commentators argue that systemic 
flaws should be interpreted in a manner compatible with the ECHR. Lord 
Kerr argues that when the CJEU referred to the system, it was referring to 
CEAS as a whole rather than the system in a given state. The source of the 
risk is operational problems in the state and fundamental rights violations 
indicate systemic flaws. Systemic flaws are not a prerequisite but an 
indication that the transferring state is aware of the problems.119 
 
Costello thinks that there are two reasons why systemic flaws cannot be a 
new prerequisite. First, article 52.3 CFREU prohibits divergence from the 
ECHR when interpreting article 4 CFREU. Second, the CJEU clearly 
followed the judgement of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.120 
 
Lübbe, at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, sees systemic flaws as a 
means to differentiate between structural problems and accidents. A 
systemic flaw according to its literal meaning need neither be common nor 
serious. It is the logical consequence of an error in the system. Accidents are 
not systemic because they are random and unforeseeable. According to the 
ECHR, a risk must be foreseeable. There is a fine line between accidents, 
and accidents that are systemic because they can be prevented. Lübbe draws 
the line where prevention exceeds what can duly be expected of the asylum 
system.121 
5.2.3 Shortcomings of the Dublin III Regulation 
The recast version of the Dublin Regulation clarifies the rights of asylum-
seekers and contains an early warnings mechanism. However, a procedure 
to suspend the transfer to member states under certain conditions was 
rejected.122 The absence of such a mechanism is problematic since the 
human rights protection becomes contingent on individual cases. Rather 
than preventing violations in a systemic and proactive manner, the system 
acts reactively and ad hoc.123 A recent study of national jurisprudence of 
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five member states shows that there are considerable disparities in the 
interpretation of systemic flaws and the conditions for the rebuttal of the 
presumption of safety.124  
                                                 
124
 Battjes and Brouwer 2015 p. 193-214. 
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6 Conclusion 
Each research question is answered below in its own heading. 
6.1 Requirements on the Legality of a 
Dublin Transfer According to Art 3 
ECHR 
The ECHR is interpreted according to its purpose, which is to guarantee 
effective individual rights protection. Article 3 ECHR is interpreted as 
prohibiting transfers when there are substantial grounds for believing that a 
person faces a real risk of being subject to a treatment contrary to article 3. 
It encompasses direct and indirect refoulement, but the ill-treatment must 
reach a minimum level of severity to amount to a breach. 
 
The ECtHR accepts the presumption that EU member states are safe, but it 
can be rebutted by information contradicting it. Such information may 
consists of reports from NGOs, but also of letters directed towards the 
transferring state or information about ongoing legal development. When 
the information is available, the transferring state must investigate the actual 
conditions. 
 
The requirement to individualize the threat is lowered, since the court 
contends that accounts that are supported by information concerning the 
general circumstances, shall be presumed to be true. Asylum-seekers are 
considered vulnerable. Their vulnerability, possibly in conjunction with 
positive law obligations, lowers the threshold for the level of ill-treatment 
tolerated. For diplomatic assurances to mitigate the risks to especially 
vulnerable asylum-seekers such as children, they must be individualized and 
detailed. 
6.2 Requirements on the Legality of a 
Dublin Transfer According to the 
Dublin Regulation 
According to the Dublin III Regulation, which entered into force subsequent 
to the CJEU judgement, a transfer is precluded when there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure 
and in the reception conditions that result in a real risk of treatment contrary 
to article 4 CFREU. 
 
The CJEU considers that the presumption of safety concerns the raison 
d’être of the EU. A conclusive presumption is incompatible with EU law, 
but the exact circumstances for its rebuttal remain uncertain. When there is 
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information available indicating deficiencies, the transferring state is 
obliged to inspect the actual conditions of the receiving state.  
6.3 Differences and Similarities 
Both the ECtHR and the CJEU recognize the presumption that EU member 
states are safe as valid, but rebuttable. According to both systems, NGO 
reports and other reliable information on the actual conditions in the 
receiving state are instrumental to its rebuttal. The CJEU sees the 
presumption as linked to the raison d’être of the EU. 
 
Substantial grounds for believing that a person faces a real risk are required 
in both systems and article 4 CFREU corresponds to article 3 ECHR. 
According to article 52.3 CFREU the meaning and scope of corresponding 
right is the same as the ECHR, which implies that ECtHR jurisprudence is 
applicable. 
 
The ECtHR has significantly lowered the threshold for ill-treatment of 
asylum-seekers, while the CJEU holds that not any infringement of the 
CEAS can lead to the suspension of a transfer. It remains to be seen whether 
the CJEU is inclined to follow the ECtHR’s lead. 
 
Systemic flaws is a prerequisite that has caused controversy. Some 
commentators argue that a violation must have systemic origin to be 
regarded, whereas others considers it an unacceptable derogation from the 
ECHR. Finally, some commentators find ways to interpret systemic flaws in 
a manner that is compatible with the ECHR. 
 
EU law should first be interpreted linguistically. Lübbe suggests such an 
interpretation where systemic is interpreted as foreseeable, which is 
compatible with the ECHR. According to systemic interpretation of EU law, 
exceptions should be interpreted narrowly. If systemic is understood as 
meaning that only violations with a particular origin can be regarded, it is 
incompatible with the ECHR. Seen in the light of the purpose of the 
regulation, recital 21 provide basis to argue that it is not required that the 
violation has a certain origin. According to recital 39, the regulation should 
be interpreted in the light of the CFREU. 
 
In conclusion, there is ample ground to argue that systemic flaws should be 
interpreted in a manner compatible with the ECHR. It would be unfortunate 
to interpret EU law in a manner that clearly is incompatible with the 
convention, as this would cause tension between the systems. However, 
there is a need for clarification on this matter from the CJEU in order to 
avoid disparate state practice. 
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6.4 Consequences from an Individual 
Rights Perspective 
The exact conditions that induce a transferring state’s responsibility to 
examine the actual conditions remain obscure. It may be argued that the 
presumption that EU member states are safe may lead the transferring state 
to overlook circumstances that amount to a violation. Meanwhile, the ECHR 
itself may be argued to contain a presumption that receiving states are safe, 
as there must be substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk of a 
violation. This is motivated by the fact that the transferring state is only 
indirectly responsible for the violation. The requirements on asylum seekers 
to rebut the ECHR presumption have been reduced. It is problematic from 
an individual rights perspective if the presumption that EU member states 
are safe is harder to rebut, as it would create an undue burden of proof for 
the applicant. 
 
NGO reports have had pivotal importance in all three cases discussed. The 
duty of inspection is a heavy burden on the transferring state, but there is 
only such an obligation when there is information indicating that inquiries 
are needed. It is troubling if the level of protection either depends on the 
availability of third-party information or on evidence submitted by the 
applicant. Furthermore, the transferring state is not responsible if the 
receiving state has issued individual and detailed guarantees. 
 
There is no procedure to suspend transfers to certain member states in the 
present Dublin III Regulation. The current system lacks a consensus of what 
conditions are unacceptable on a general level. Therefore, the assessment 
must be made on a case-by-case basis and there is a substantial risk that the 
states react first after individual rights have been violated. Furthermore, it is 
left to national authorities to assess whether other EU member states fulfil 
their obligations according to EU law and they differ in their interpretation 
of the prerequisites. 
 
However, once the presumption of safety is rebutted, asylum-seekers are 
well protected. The requirement to individualize the risk is reduced, their 
accounts should be presumed to be true if supported by circumstantial 
evidence and the acceptance for ill-treatment is low given the vulnerability 
of asylum-seekers. That this marks a paradigm shift is mirrored in the 
critique of the court for its readiness to accept these reduced requirements. It 
has also caused uncertainty as to whether positive EU law obligations result 
in a lower tolerance for ill-treatment in EU member states than elsewhere. 
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